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A Muddy Decision - The High Court Fails To Define
The Corps' Wetland Jurisdiction In Rapanos v. United
States
Jill Lambird*
I. INTRODUCTION
So, who cares about stinky swamps anyway? Apparently more
people than one might think. Wetlands, otherwise known as sloughs,
bogs, or marshes are extremely valuable resources. They provide
fertile breeding grounds for fish and birds, and they naturally control
erosion and flooding. Wetlands also play a critical role in water
purification, effectively removing sediments, organic wastes, and
other pollutants while producing oxygen and nutrients. Wetlands
also make great homes for people. They are invariably flat and easy
to build on once groundwater is removed. Also, wetlands tend to be
near rivers, lakes, and coastlines - areas under high pressure from
human development.
It's no wonder that wetlands have sparked argument throughout
the courts for decades. Wetlands are not only a hot topic in the
courts; they also permeate political ideologies, scientific thought, and
social movements. Developers want to build on them,
environmentalists want to save them, and thousands of critters
(present company included) want to call them home. In fact, this
issue creates polarity almost everywhere it surfaces.
Modem debates regarding the definition and regulation of
wetlands have existed since Congress passed the Clean Water Act
(CWA) in 1972.1 The most current debate, found in Rapanos v.
United States poses the following question: Does the federal
* J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387 (2000).
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government have jurisdiction over wetlands that may be part of a
drainage area or tributary system but do not physically abut the
"navigable waters" to which the CWA refers? 2
This note explores the Rapanos decision. Part II illustrates the
legislative, legal, and administrative history of issues set forth in the
case.' Part III details the facts and procedural history of the case.4
Part IV analyzes the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia, concurrences
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, and dissenting
opinions by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer.5 Part V considers
Rapanos' legislative, judicial, and social impact.6  Lastly, Part VI
concludes the discussion of Rapanos and its effect on federal wetland
jurisdiction.7
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Commerce Clause
8
Most federal environmental legislation is rooted in Congress'
authority to regulate interstate commerce. 9 The Supreme Court first
construed Congress' commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, where
2. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).
3. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
4. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
5. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
6. See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
7. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes.
8 . The Commerce Clause empowers the United States Congress "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The
Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
719, 755 -761. The Commerce Clause grants Congress three regulatory categories:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e. those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
the Court supported federal law over state law in determining
shippers' rights to navigate the nation's waters. 10 After the Court's
decision in Gibbons, there was a lull in Commerce Clause decisions,
resulting in a "state of confusion."" However, in the late 1800s,
laissez-faire economics gradually provoked another shift in
jurisprudence that caused the Court to impose stifling limits on
federal commerce power.' 2  Along with the Great Depression, the
scope of Congress' commerce power stretched once again with the
passage of New Deal legislation.' 3  Consequently, Congress'
commerce authority grew into a commanding legislative force with
10. Joshua L. Lee, Note, Federal Wetland Jurisdiction and the Power to
Regulate Commerce: Searching for the Nexus in Gerke Excavating, 2006 BYU L.
REv. 263, 265-72 (2006). In Gibbons, a state act gave certain individuals an
exclusive right to use steam navigation in all New York waters for 30 years
beginning in 1808. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 8 (1824). The Supreme Court
held that the Act of Congress gave full authority to defendants' vessels to navigate
the waters of the United States. Lee, supra note 10, at 266. The New York state
law, prohibiting the vessels from navigating state waters, was repugnant to the
Constitution and void. Id. Chief Justice Marshall established that the Commerce
power "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id.
Significantly, Gibbons granted Congress regulatory control over channels of
commerce. Id. at 267.
11. Id. at 267. The law and doctrine of the earlier cases with respect to the
fostering and protection of navigation are well summed up in a frequently cited
passage from the Court's opinion in Gilman v. Philadelphia.
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce
comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent
necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which
are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For
this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and
subject to all requisite legislation by Congress. This necessarily
includes the power to keep them open and free from any
obstruction to their navigation, interposed by the States or
otherwise; to remove such obstructions when they exist; and to
provide, by such sanctions as they may deem proper, against the
occurrence of the evil and for the punishment of offenders. For
these purposes, Congress possesses all the powers which existed
in the States before the adoption of the national Constitution, and
which have always existed in the Parliament in England.
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-25 (1866).
12. Id. at 268.
13. Id. at 269.
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firm approval from the Court. 14 As a result, Congress was able to use
its commerce power to impress environmental regulations on the
nation's waterways.'
5
While environmental regulation expanded through Congress'
control of commerce in the 1970s and 1980s, state autonomy
depreciated. 16 State and local governments began to lobby for more
control over environmental regulation.17 Not until 1995 did the
Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez finally strike down a federal
statute under the Commerce Clause for the first time in over fifty
years.' 8  Fortunately for state and local governments, Lopez
drastically limited the reach of federal power to regulate
environmental law under the Commerce Clause.' 9
The Supreme Court continued its strict scrutiny review of
Commerce Clause legislation when it decided United States v.
Morrison in 2000.20 There, the Court invalidated a clause in the
Violence Against Women Act that gave victims of sexual abuse a
private cause of action, as it was outside Congress' remedial power
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.2'
The Court affirmed the lower court decision, holding that gender-
motivated crimes were not considered economic activity, and
therefore, the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the authority
14. Id. at 272.
15. Id. at 273-80.
16. Jaimie Y. Tanabe, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal
Environmental Law survive in the Post-SWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism?, 31
ENV. LAW 1051, 1060-62 (2001).
17. Id. at 1060.
18. Id. In a five-to-four majority, the Court in Lopez struck down the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibited the possession of firearms near
schools. Id. The Court held that the Act violated Congress' Commerce Clause
power because it was a criminal statute that essentially had nothing to do with
commerce. Id. at 1061. Also, the Act was not an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity. Id. The Court realized that its interpretation of the
commerce power was slipping further from its original meaning as determined by
the framers of the Constitution. Id. The Court had essentially given Congress
general police power authority through Commerce Clause justification, to the
detriment of the State's traditional powers. Id.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
21. Id. at 607-08.
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to enact a statute regulating such crimes.22
Both Lopez and Morrison laid the foundation for the Court's limit
on the CWA's scope, under which jurisdiction is frequently asserted
on the basis of substantial effects on interstate commerce. 23  The
Court displayed its willingness to curtail federal Commerce Clause
jurisdiction in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), even though the holding itself
did not rest on constitutional grounds.24
The Court eventually addressed the effect of Lopez on the CWA's
scope in SWANCC, which is discussed further in Subsection C of this
Part.25 SWANCC questioned Congress' constitutional authority to
regulate isolated wetlands based on their status as migratory bird
habitats.26 Relying on Lopez, a county agency argued that Congress
could not require it to obtain a federal permit under section 404(a) of
the CWA to fill wetlands in an abandoned sand-and-gravel pit. 27 The
Court, in a five-four opinion, dodged the constitutional issue by
construing section 404(a) quite narrowly.28 The Court deduced that
Congress lacked clear intent to apply section 404(a) to isolated
wetlands simply due to their status as migratory bird habitats. In fact,
the Court believed that such characterization would encroach on
"states' traditional and primary power over land and water use.",29 To
avoid "significant constitutional and federalism questions," the Court
held that section 404(a)'s jurisdictional predicate - "waters of the
United States" - did not include isolated wetlands where migratory
birds are present.30 Thus, SWANCC narrows the jurisdictional reach
of the CWA, while leaving the ultimate effect of Lopez on federal
constitutional authority to protect the environment unresolved.3'
22. Id. at 613.
23. Kimberly Breedon, Note, The Reach of Raich: Implications for
Legislative Amendments and Judicial Interpretations of the Clean Water Act, 74 U.
CfN. L. REV. 1441, 1456 (2006).
24. Id.
25. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 174.
30. Id. at 174.
31. Id.
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B. Early Wetland Legislation
Primary destruction of wetlands came from draining, filling, and
converting wetlands to dry land.32 Early American colonists quickly
began draining wetlands with small ditches, which continued during
Westward Expansion. 33 In 1850, Congress passed the Swamp Land
Act, which allowed the state to "reclaim the swamp and overflowed
lands therein." 34 Later, in 1899, the Rivers and Harbors Act gave the
Army Corps of Engineers authority to regulate construction activities
involving dredging, filling or obstructing navigable waters.35 This
Act is still in effect today. 36 Under section 541, a developer needs to
apply to the Corps prior to building any structure in any water of the
United States.3 7 Specifically, section 403 prohibits the "creation of
any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States...38
This regulation did not extend to most wetlands because most
wetland areas are outside the mean high water mark of navigable
waters, the area over which the Corps has authority.39 In large part,
the Corps does not regulate wetlands at all under this Act.4 °
The deferral government's anti-wetland policy reached a high in
the early 20th century when it, "in essence, provided free engineering
services to farmers to drain wetlands" and "shared the cost of
drainage projects.,4 1  But eventually, the growing body of
information on wetlands prompted a change in policy.42 The shift
32. Lee, supra note 10, at 282.
33. Id.
34. Id. The first legislation on wetlands, the Swamp Lands Acts of 1849,
1850, and 1860, conveyed to 16 states all swamp and flood lands so the states
could convert these lands to agricultural use. See Hearing on Federal Wetlands
Regulations: Hearing Before the Comm. on Small Business, 102d Cong. 54 (1991)
(statement of Elizabeth Raisbeck, Senior Vice President, National Audubon
Society).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 403.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Lee, supra note 10, at 282.
42. Murray G. Sagsveen and Matthew A. Sagsveen, Waterfowl Protection
began in 1934 when Congress passed the Migratory Bird Hunting
Stamp Act which imposed a cost on hunting waterfowl and allocated
some of the proceeds for acquiring wetlands to be set aside as
"Waterfowl Protection Areas."
43
Before the colonists' reclamation began, wetlands comprised
about 225 million acres of the United States territory. 4 Since then,
extensive losses have occurred, and over half of our original wetlands
have been drained and converted to other uses.45 The years from the
mid-1950s to the mid-1970s were a time of major wetland loss, but
since then the rate of loss has decreased. Between 1986 and 1997, an
estimated 58,500 acres of wetlands were lost each year in the
continental United States.46
The enormous loss of wetlands eventually prompted further
reaction from the federal government to regulate in this area. In
1969, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was enacted,
which requires all federal agencies to consider potential adverse
environmental impacts in evaluating major federal actions, which
include permit approvals.47
The primary basis for the federal regulation of wetland habitats
derives from the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly
known as the Clean Water Act.48
C. Clean Water Act
In 1972, Congress passed the Clean Water Act. Its stated
Areas: An Updated State Program, 76 N. DAK. L. REv. 861, 861-62 (2000).
43. Id. See also Virginia C. Veltman, Comment, Banking on the Future of
Wetlands Using Federal Law, 89 NW. U. L. REv. 654, 656 (1995). Early laws
tended to focus on waterfowl nesting and breeding, including the Wetlands Loan
Act of 1961, amendments to the Migratory Bird Stamp Act of 1934, and the Water
Bank Act of 1970. Id.
44. Lee, supra note 10, at 283.
45. US Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Status and Trends
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/status.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
46. Id.
47. Maher M. Shomali, Maryland Native Plant Society v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers: The Corps of Engineers Must Clearly Justify a Decision to Authroize
Activity Having Adverse Environmental Effects, 12 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 213, 215
(2005).
48. Id. at 215-16.
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objective is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters., 49 More specifically, the
CWA prohibits unpermitted discharges of pollutants to "navigable
waters." 5° The term "navigable waters" is defined in section 1362(7)
to mean "the waters of the United States, including territorial seas." 51
Questions concerning how broadly to interpret "waters of the United
States" and the extent to Congress's constitutional authority to
regulate certain waters have generated considerable litigation, as
discussed in more detail below.52
The question of what constitutes the "waters of the United States"
for purposes of defining the jurisdiction limits of federal authority
under the CWA is enormously important. Approximately 98 to 99
percent of the nation's water bodies are not waters that would be
considered traditionally navigable. 53 The quality of navigable waters
is significantly affected by the quality of both their non-navigable
tributaries and of wetlands adjacent to both navigable waters and
their non-navigable tributaries. The CWA's section 404 permitting
rules use "navigable waters" as their touchstone for federal
jurisdiction.
Section 404 of the CWA is the most relevant section with regards
to wetlands. 54  Section 404 generally prohibits the discharge of
49. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2215 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
50. 33 C.F.R. § 502.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).
52. See infra Part III and IV and accompanying notes.
53. Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy (5th
ed. 2006).
54. 33 C.F.R. § 404 (g)(1)(2006).
The Governor of any State desiring to administer its own
individual and general permit program for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters (other than
those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in
their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means
to transport interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their
ordinary high water mark, including all waters which are subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to their mean high
water mark, or mean higher high water mark on the west coast,
including wetlands adjacent thereto), within its jurisdiction may
submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of the
program it proposes to establish and administer under State law
or under an interstate compact. In addition, such State shall
dredged or fill material into waters of the United States without a
permit from the Corps.55 The Corps and Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) regulations under the section 404 program define
"waters of the United States" for which a permit must be obtained to
include, among other things: (1) interstate waters; (2) waters which
are or could be used in interstate commerce; (3) waters such as
wetlands, the use or degradation of which could affect interstate
commerce; (4) tributaries of the waters identified above; and (5)
wetlands adjacent to these waters.56 As such, this program is the
nation's primary wetland protection program. In addition to the
federal regulation of wetlands, some state and local governments
have developed wetland protection measures 58
Traditionally, the use of the definite article ("the") and the plural
number ("waters") in "waters of the United States" were thought to
submit a statement from the attorney general (or the attorney for
those State agencies which have independent legal counsel), or
from the chief legal officer in the case of an interstate agency,
that the laws of such State, or the interstate compact, as the case
may be, provide adequate authority to carry out the described
program.
Id.
55. Id. at 4. By issuing wetland fill permits, the United States Army Corps of
Engineers demands that all relevant factors and cumulative effects be considered,
among those being conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental
concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards,
floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation,
water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber
production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general,
the needs and welfare of the people. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2215. Section 404(e)
of the CWA authorizes the Corps to develop general permits on a geographic basis
for categories of activities having minimal environmental impact. 33 C.F.R. §
404(e). Section 404(f) identifies activities exempt from the permitting requirement,
including certain ongoing farming activities. 33 C.F.R. § 404(f). Section 404(g)
authorizes states (and tribes) to establish their own programs. 33 C.F.R § 404(e)-
(g)(2006).
56. Id. at 4-5.
57. Id. The Corps administers section 404 permitting responsibilities, while
the EPA in conjunction with the Corps establishes the substantive environmental
protection standards that permit applicants must meet. EPA also has final
administrative responsibility for interpreting the term "waters of the United States,"
a term that governs the scope of many other programs that EPA administers under
the CWA. Id. at 5.
58. Id.
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illustrate that "waters" refers more narrowly to water as found in
streams and standing bodies such as oceans, rivers, and lakes, or the
flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such
streams or bodies.59 Under this definition, "the waters of the United
States" include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies
of water.60 The definition refers to water as found in streams, oceans,
rivers, lakes, and bodies of water forming geographical features. 61
All of these terms imply continuously present, fixed bodies of water,
as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which water
occasionally or intermittently flows. 62 Even the least substantial of
the definition's terms, namely "streams," connotes a continuous flow
of water in a permanent channel, especially when used in company
with other terms such as rivers, lakes, and oceans.63 None of these
terms seems to encompass transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of
water.64
After a district court enjoined these regulations as too narrow, the
Corps adopted a much broader definition. 65  The Corps' current
regulations interpret "the waters of the United States" to include, in
addition to traditional interstate navigable waters, all interstate waters
including interstate wetlands; all other waters such as intrastate lakes,
rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or
natural ponds, the use, degradation, or destruction of which could
affect interstate or foreign commerce; tributaries of such waters; and
59. Id. See also, The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870) (holding that "navigable
waters of the United States" include interstate waters that are "navigable in fact" or
readily susceptible of being rendered so.).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.
1975). In Calloway, environmental groups challenged the interpretation of federal
jurisdiction as too narrow because it extended only to waters that were actually,
potentially, or historically navigable. Id. The court held that Congress had not
intended the term "navigable waters" to be limited to the traditional tests of
navigability. Id. On the contrary, Congress had intended to extend federal
regulatory authority to the limits of its commerce clause powers. Id. On the basis
of Calloway, the Corps expanded its regulations to specifically include wetlands.
27-1
wetlands adjacent to such waters and tributaries (other than waters
that are themselves wetlands).66 The regulation defines "adjacent"
wetlands as those bordering, contiguous to, or neighboring waters of
the United States.6" It specifically provides that wetlands separated
from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are adjacent
wetlands.
68
D. Case History
The progression of the CWA terms "navigable waters" and
"waters of the United States" have a long and convoluted history.
Nearly 100 years before the CWA's existence, The Daniel Ball
defined "navigable waters" as those that are "navigable in fact"
meaning that such waters "susceptible of being used. . . in their
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a
continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on
with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in
which such commerce is conducted by water., 69  This traditional
definition is much narrower than the modern definition espoused by
the CWA. Since the traditional definition of the CWA terms
"navigable waters" and "waters of the United States," require that the
"waters" be navigable in fact, or susceptible of being rendered so, it
cannot be applied wholesale to the CWA. 70 The CWA's "navigable
waters" are simply defined as "the waters of the United States."71
Moreover, the CWA provides, in certain circumstances, for an even
wider definition including waters that are presently used, or are
susceptible to use, in their natural condition or by reasonable
improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce,
66. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2004).
67. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2004).
68. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2004).
69. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563. In The Daniel Ball, the Grand River was
regarded as a navigable water of the United States because it was capable of
bearing a 123 ton steamer, laden with passengers and merchandise, as far as Grand
Rapids, Michigan, which is about forty miles from the mouth of Lake Michigan.
Id. at 564.
70. Id. at 563-566.
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
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including adjacent wetlands.7 2 This provision shows that the CWA's
term "navigable waters" includes something more than traditional
navigable waters. The United States Supreme Court has twice stated
that the meaning of "navigable waters" in the CWA is broader than
the traditional understanding of that term. 73  The Court has also
emphasized, however, that the qualifier "navigable" is not devoid of
significance. 74 Through an examination of progressive case law, the
expansion and contraction of the traditional definition of "navigable
waters" and "waters of the United States" is revealed.
The test laid down in The Daniel Ball was generally adhered to
by the Supreme Court until the decision in United States v.
Appalachian Electric Power Company, in which the Court gave the
term "navigable waters" a broader construction than that in The
Daniel Ball and in subsequent decisions. 75 In Appalachian Electric
Power Co., the Court considered the Federal Power Act, which
defines navigable waters as follows:
[N]avigable waters are those parts of streams or other
bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction
under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States, and which either
in their natural or improved condition notwithstanding
interruptions between the navigable parts of such
streams or waters by falls, shallows, or rapids
compelling land carriage, are used or suitable for use
for the transportation of persons or property in
interstate or foreign commerce, including therein all
such interrupting falls, shallows, or rapids, together
with such other parts of streams as shall have been
authorized by Congress for improvement by the
United States or shall have been recommended to
Congress for such improvement after investigation
under its authority.76
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1).
73. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220.
74. Id.
75. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 791(a).
This definition is considerably broader than that used in The
Daniel Ball because it includes any water than can potentially be
used in interstate or foreign commerce, including shallows or rapids
which are not navigable in fact. Thus, the new definition of
"navigable waters" includes such waters that are not traditionally
navigable in fact.
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Supreme Court
recognized the CWA's overarching scope.7 Before this case came to
the Supreme Court, the Corps defined and redefined the term
"navigable waters" in the CWA to include "areas that are inundated
or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, bogs and similar areas." 78
In Riverside Bayview, respondent Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
filled part of its property in preparation for construction of a housing
development. 79 The Corps argued, under the current CWA definition
of navigable waters, that the "adjacent wetlands" at issue were under
the Corps' jurisdiction. Thus, respondent illegally filled the wetland
without a permit as required by the Corps. 80 The Court determined
that no taking under the Fifth Amendment had occurred since there
was no evidence that the denial of a permit would deny respondent
economically viable use of its land.81  Holding that the Corps'
construction of the Act was reasonable, the Court extended the Corps
permit-granting authority under section 1344 to wetlands adjacent to
"navigable waters," given Congress' broad definition of navigable
waters as "waters of the United States.",82 Thus, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, because petitioner
United States was entitled to an injunction to prohibit respondent
77. Thomas L. Casey, III, Reevaluating "Isolated Waters": Is Hydrologically
Connected Ground Water "Navigable Water" Under the Clean Water Act?, 54
ALA. L. REV. 159, 161 (2002).
78. United States v. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985) (quoting
The Clean Water Act, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 126.
82. Id. at 138-39.
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developer from filling "wetlands" adjacent to "waters of the United
States," since the issuance of regulations requiring a permit for such
use was not a "taking" of property, and the Corps had authority to
require a permit under a reasonable construction of the CWA.
83
After the Court adopted this decision, the Corps adopted increasingly
broad interpretations of its own regulations under the CWA.
84
Riverside Bayview explicitly rejected case-by-case determinations of
ecological significance for the jurisdictional question whether a
wetland is covered under the CWA, holding instead that all
physically connected wetlands are covered. 85 The decision reflects
concern that a more restrictive interpretation of regulatory authority
could undermine the congressional goal of providing comprehensive
protection to water quality. The Corps and lower courts continued to
define tributaries and adjacent wetlands broadly.
In 2001, the Supreme Court revisited the meaning of "navigable
waters" in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
SWANCC.86 There, Petitioner was a conglomerate of municipalities
which sought to develop a deserted gravel pit as a solid waste
disposal site. 87 Respondent United States Army Corps of Engineers
denied Petitioner's application for a disposal permit on the ground
that, even though the gravel pit ponds constituted non-navigable
isolated, intrastate waters, they were subject to protection as habitats
for migratory birds. 88 The Court held that Respondent's regulatory
interpretation of the CWA to include the gravel pit, based solely on
its nature as a bird habitat, impermissibly extended respondent's
jurisdiction to ponds that were not adjacent to open water.89
Even though Respondent's interpretation was never overruled by
83. Id.
84. Casey, supra note 76 at 161.
85. Id.
86. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty v. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
87. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 676.
88. Id. at 164. The Corps asserted jurisdiction over the site under subpart (b)
of the "Migratory Bird Rule." Id. In fact, the Corps found about 121 bird species
had previously been observed at the site. Id. Though SWANCC made various
proposals to mitigate any potential damage to the bird habitat and secured water
quality certification from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps
refused to issue a section 404(a) permit. Id. at 165.
89. Id.
legislation, it did not indicate congressional acquiescence to such
jurisdiction either.90  Further, the significant constitutional issues
presented by Respondent's attempt to usurp the states' traditional and
primary power over land and water use, precluded administrative
deference and warranted reading the statute as written rather than as
interpreted by respondent. 9' Judgment was reversed; even though
Petitioner's proposed waste disposal site was a habitat for migratory
birds, federal agency jurisdiction did not extend to such non-
navigable, isolated, intrastate waters under the clean water statute
which expressly limited such jurisdiction to navigable waters. 92
Since the Court's decision in SWANCC, district and appellate
courts have struggled to define the Corps' power in various situations
dealing with wetlands and ephemeral waters. Lower courts
interpreted SWANCC as restricting federal authority only where it
turned solely on the potential presence of migratory birds.93
In Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, the Tenth Circuit was
pressed with the issue of whether a sewer system could be included
in the definition of "waters of the United States" in the CWA, thus
necessitating a permit granted by the Corps.9 4 Defendant argued that
the discharge in question was not covered by the CWA because it
was discharged into a sewer system rather than directly into "the
waters of the United States." 95 However, the Tennessee district court
found that argument unavailing because it determined that the fact
that a discharge followed through a conveyance before reaching
covered water did not remove the discharge from CWA's
jurisdiction. 96 The pollutant was discharged into a shaft that emptied
into a tunnel which, in turn, traveled 2.5 miles before discharging
90. Id. at 173-74.
91. Id. at 167.
92. Id. at 192-94.
93. See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Gerke, 412 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2005); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,
243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 340
(5th Cir. 2001). However, the Fifth Circuit in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250
F. 3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) and In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003)
concluded that federal jurisdiction extended only to waters that are actually
navigable or adjacent to an open body of navigable water. Id. at 344.
94. Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005).
95. Id. at 1148-49.
96. Id. at 1149-50.
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into navigable water.97  In reviewing the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit concluded that CWA jurisdiction was
established, in part, because the discharge was from a point source,
the shaft, which merely flowed through "other conveyances" before
reaching navigable water. 98 Thus, the court effectively determined
that point sources that eventually reach navigable water are included
in the Corp's jurisdiction. 99
In Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, the
Ninth Circuit had the task of determining whether a pond was subject
to the CWA because it contained wetlands that were adjacent to a
navigable river of the United States. 100 The City discharged sewage
into a pond, which was a quarry pit that had filled with water from a
surrounding aquifer, and which was also located next to a river.
10 1
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the pond and its wetlands
possessed a significant nexus to navigable waters because the pond
waters seeped directly into the navigable river. 10 2  The river and
surrounding area rested on top of a vast gravel bed extending as far
as sixty feet into the earth. 10 3  The bed was a porous medium,
saturated with water. 104 Beneath the surface, water soaked in and out
of the pond via the aquifer, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week, 365 days a year.'0 5 Moreover, there was an actual surface
connection between the pond and the river where the river
overflowed the levee between them. 10 6  Thus, there were
hydrological connections between the two. 10 7 What's more, there
were ecological connections, and the pond significantly affected the
chemical integrity of the river by increasing its chloride levels. 10 8
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1141.
99. Id. at 1149-50.
100. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th
Cir. 2005).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1027.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1028.
106. Id. at 1030.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1031. At high enough levels, chlorides can create toxic conditions
for aquatic biota.
Finally, neither the waste treatment nor the excavation operation
exceptions applied.10 9 Through the use of the "significant nexus"
test, the court looked deeper into a water body's ecological relation to
other waters in order to determine its scope under the CWA. 110
While appellate courts continued expanding the definition of
"navigable waters", the Northern District of Texas still held on to a
narrower scope of the CWA."' In United States v. Chevron Pipe
Company, the connection of generally dry channels and creek beds
would not suffice to create a "significant nexus" to navigable water
simply because one fed into the next during the rare times of actual
flow." '2 The unnamed tributary at issue, into which the oil spilled,
was strikingly similar to a dry arroyo." 3 The United States admitted
that only during times of flow was there an unbroken surface water
tributary connection to a river.' 14 The proper inquiry was whether
the site of the farthest traverse of the spill was navigable-in-fact or
adjacent to an open body of navigable water.115  A declaration
submitted by the government did not state that sufficient flow
actually occurred during the relevant time frame. 116 There was no
evidence that oil was actually transported by stream flow during a
time of flow to a navigable-in-fact water or open body of water 117
Some evidence was required that oil actually reached a navigable
waterway - evidence more than speculation that such an event could
occur. 8 Absent actual evidence that the site of the farthest traverse
of the spill was navigable-in-fact or adjacent to an open body of
navigable water, a "significant nexus" was not present.1 9
Next, another Ninth Circuit decision continued to enforce a low
bar against the Corps. In Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. US
109. Id. at 1031-32.
110. Id. at 1033.
111. United States v. Chevron Pipe Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 615 (N.D. Tex.
2006).
112. Id. at 613.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 614.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 615.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Army Corps of Engineers, the Corps determined that the wetlands at
issue were adjacent to tidal waters and thus were subject to its
jurisdiction under the CWA. 120 The Corps offered the developer a
permit to fill 2.36 acres of wetlands subject to certain conditions.'12
The developer signed the permit and then brought the instant
action.1 22 The appellate court found that the Corps had jurisdiction
over the adjacent wetlands as defined in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c), and
did not depend on the existence of a significant hydrological or
ecological connection between the particular wetlands at issue and
waters of the United States. 23  The Corps' findings were not
arbitrary or capricious such that the court would be required to set
them aside pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706, and were more than sufficient
to establish a significant nexus between the wetlands on the site and
the flood control channels. 124 The CWA did not require a significant
hydrological or ecological connection as necessary for the Corps to
have jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands. 125
Thus, since the Supreme Court's ruling in SWANCC, appellate
and district courts have construed the meaning in a variety of creative
ways. In hopes of remedying the confusion in lower courts, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to review the consolidated
cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers.126 The facts of both cases are set forth
below.
III. FACTS
A. Procedural History
Rapanos v. United States consists of two companion cases that
120. Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 425
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005).
121. Id. at 1152.
122. Id. at 1153.
123. Id. at 1155.
124. Id. at 1157.
125. Id. at 1158.
126. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2004).
"Unfortunately, the two leading Supreme Court cases on the reach of the CWA
have done little to clear the muddied waters of CWA jurisdiction." Id.
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arose from the development of four Michigan wetlands. Originally,
both cases, Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, were separately brought before Eastern
District of Michigan trial courts before reaching the Sixth Circuit on
appeal. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases when it granted
certiorari. 2
7
At the time of the original Rapanos case, the Corps had
essentially boundless discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny
a section 404 permit, relying on such factors as economics,
recreation, and the general needs and welfare of the people. 28 The
dicta noted that the average applicant for an individual permit spends
788 days and $271,596 in completing the process.' 29
John Rapanos owned three of the four properties, all of which lay
near ditches or human-made drains and eventually flowed into either
a river or Lake Huron.' 30  In 1989, Rapanos began filling and
clearing his land even after a private consultant and the state told him
that a permit was probably required.' 3 ' Federal officials brought
criminal charges and instituted a civil action. 132 Rapanos faced sixty-
three months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in
criminal and civil fines. 133  The Rapanoses and their affiliated
businesses deposited fill material without a permit into wetlands on
three sites near Midland, Michigan. 134 The district court found that
the wetlands were "within federal jurisdiction" because they were
"adjacent to other waters of the United States."'135 On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed, holding that there was federal jurisdiction
over the wetlands at all three sites because "there were hydrological
connections between all three sites and corresponding adjacent
tributaries of navigable waters."'' 36
The proceedings against the Rapanoses comprise a small part of
127. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2219.
128. Id. at 2215.
129. Id. at 2214.
130. Id. at 2219.
131. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 632.
132. Id. at 633-34.
133. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2215.
134. Id. at 2219.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 643).
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the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that has
occurred under the CWA during the past five Presidential
administrations. 137 Before the Court's decision here, almost any land
area that is ever touched by water can potentially be regulated as a
"water of the United States."' 38
The fourth property, from the companion case, was a wetland on
which Keith and June Carabell wanted to build condominiums. 139
There, the Carabells were denied a permit to deposit fill material in a
wetland located on a triangular parcel of land about one mile from
Lake St. Clair, a 430-square-mile lake on the Michigan-Ontario
border.' 40 Unlike Rapanos, a human-made barrier ran between the
ditch and the Carabell's land.' 4 ' The state department of the
environment and the Corps denied the Carabells' permit application
and after their administrative appeal was rejected, they filed suit
challenging the exercise of federal regulatory jurisdiction over their
site. 142 The district court ruled that there was federal jurisdiction
because the wetland "is adjacent to neighboring tributaries of
navigable waters and has a significant nexus to 'waters of the United
States. "143 The appellate court affirmed the decision.'44
B. Case Facts
In Rapanos, John Rapanos owned a land parcel near Midland,
Michigan, known as the Salzburg site. 145 A company he controlled
owned another nearby parcel known as the Hines Road site. 146 His
wife and a company she controlled owned a third site known as the
Pine River site. 147 In December 1988, Rapanos, hoping to construct a
137. Id. at 2215.
138. Id.
139. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923-24
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
140. Id. at 923.
141. Id.
142. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704, 706 (6th Cir.
2004).
143. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2219.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2238.
146. Id.
147. Id.
shopping center, asked the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources to inspect the Salzburg site. 148 A state official told
Rapanos that while the site was probably under the state's definition
of wetlands, Rapanos could continue with the project if the wetlands
were delineated or if a permit were obtained. 149 Rapanos chose the
delineation option and hired a wetlands consultant to survey the
property. 150 The consultant said that his lands were wetlands and
Rapanos allegedly threatened to destroy the consultant's career
unless he got rid of the report. 151 Then Rapanos ordered $350,000
worth of earthmoving and land-clearing work that filled in twenty-
two of the sixty-four wetland acres on the Salzburg site. 152 He did
this without a permit and despite receiving cease and desist orders
from state officials and the EPA. 153 Additionally, construction work
at the Hines Road and Pines River sites was in violation of the state,
and federal compliance orders altered another seventeen and fifteen
wetlands acres. 1
54
In the case at hand, the United States alleges civil violations of
the CWA against all Rapanos petitioners claiming that petitioners
discharged fill into jurisdictional wetlands, failed to respond to
requests for information, and ignored administrative compliance
orders. 155 The trial and appellate court decisions were in favor of the
government. 56 Here, the Supreme Court grants certiorari to consider
the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands on the Salzburg, Hines Road,
and Pine River Sites. 157
In Carabell, petitioners Keith and June Carabell applied for a
permit from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
(MDEQ) (which follows Section 1344(g)) in order to fill in wetlands
on a right triangle-shaped parcel they owned, to construct 130
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2238-39.
153. Id. at 2239.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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condominium units. 158 The MDEQ denied the permit. 159 A state
Administrative Law Judge directed the agency to approve an
alternative plan proposed by the Carabells, that involved the
construction of 112 units. 160  This plan would fill 12.2 acres and
create retention ponds on 3.74 acres. 16 1 Since the EPA objected to
the permit, jurisdiction over the case transferred to the Corps (Section
13440)). 162  The Corps concluded that the Carabell property
"provide[d] water storage functions that, if destroyed, could result in
an increased risk of erosion and degradation of water quality in the
Sutherland-Oemig Drain, Auvase Creek, and Lake St. Clair."'16
3
In the case at hand, the Carabells challenged the permit denial
and the Corps' jurisdiction. 164 The district court granted subject
matter jurisdiction for Corps.' 65  The appellate court affirmed. 166
After consolidating the Rapanos' case with the Carabells', the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 167
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
In Rapanos v. United States, the Court divided 4-1-4 in its efforts
to define the scope United States Army Corps of Engineers'
jurisdiction over "waters of the United States." Though the Court
struggled to create a clean test for analysis, it remained divided on
the issue of federal power over "navigable waters." Fortunately,
some direction can be adapted from Justice Kennedy's middle
ground approach which provides the Corps an appropriate amount of
discretion to use their scientific proficiency. Regrettably, Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion and Justice Steven's dissenting opinion
embrace totally opposite ends of the jurisdictional spectrum. Both
plurality and dissent reinforce the dichotomy between state and
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2240.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2240.
federal authority with regards to wetland development and
preservation.
A. Plurality: Surface Connection Requirement
The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgments in both
cases and remanded for lower level review. In the Court's plurality
opinion, Justice Scalia narrows the range of CWA interpretations to
preserve state autonomy while observing the intent of Congress in its
construction of federal environmental law.
In the introduction to his opinion, Justice Scalia submits general
background information on the case and the history of the Clean
Water Act. 68 Critiquing the immense scope of agency power held
by the Corps, Justice Scalia denounces the burdens of time and cost
that the section 404 program imposes on landowners.' 69
In Part I of the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia offers a brief
history of the CWA. 170 In order to meet its objective "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
nation's waters," the CWA makes the "discharge of any pollutant
unlawful."' 171 However, section 404 permits may be issued at the
Corps' discretion "for the discharge of . . . fill material into the
navigable waters."' 172
Traditionally, such navigable waters of the United States were
defined as those relatively permanent, standing or continuously
168. Id. at 2214.
169. Id. at 2215. Justice Scalia provides outstanding figures:
In the last three decades, the Corps and the [EPA] have
interpreted their jurisdiction over "the waters of the United
States" to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the
United States .... The Corps has also asserted jurisdiction over
virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit -
whether manmade or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or
ephemeral - through which rainwater or drainage may
occasionally or intermittently flow .... [T]he entire land area of
the United States lies in some drainage basin, and an endless
network of visible channels furrows the entire surface ....
Id. Essentially all land in the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the
Corps. Id.
170. Id. at2215-19.
171. Id. at 2215.
172. Id. at 2215-16.
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flowing bodies of water "forming geographic features" that are
described in ordinary terms as "streams," "oceans, rivers [and]
lakes," and do not include channels through which water flows
intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide
drainage for rainfall. 173 Over time, however, the Corps successfully
extended the definition of "navigable waters" and "waters of the
United States" to include not only traditional interstate waters, but
"all interstate waters including interstate wetlands."'174 Throughout
the opinion, Justice Scalia argues for an end to the Corps' expansive
interpretation of "navigable waters" because it is not "based on a
permissible construction of the statute."175
Thus, Justice Scalia seeks to decipher the meaning of "waters" as
keyed to the CWA's purpose and previous case law. 176 While the
meaning of "navigable waters" in the CWA is broader than the
traditional definition found in The Daniel Ball, the CWA authorizes
federal jurisdiction only over "waters. ' 177 The CWA's use of the
traditional phrase "navigable waters" further confirms that the CWA
confers jurisdiction only over relatively permanent bodies of
water. 
178
Traditionally, such "waters" included only discrete bodies of
water, and the term still carries some of its original substance. 179
This Court's subsequent interpretation of "the waters of the United
States" in the CWA likewise confirms this limitation. 8 ° And the
CWA itself categorizes the channels and conduits that typically carry
intermittent flows of water separately from "navigable waters,"
including them in the definition of "point sources."' 181 Moreover,
only the foregoing definition of "waters" is consistent with CWA's
stated policy "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of the States . . to plan the development
173. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2882 (2nd ed. 1934).
174. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216.
175. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
176. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216-19.
177. Id. at 2216.
178. Id.
179. SWANCC, 531 U.S at 172. See also Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131.
180. Rapanos. 126 S. Ct. at 2216.
181. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
and use . . . of land and water resources ...."182 In addition, "the
waters of the United States" hardly qualifies as the clear and manifest
statement from Congress needed to authorize intrusion into such an
area of traditional state authority as land-use regulation, and to
authorize federal action that stretches the limits of Congress's
commerce power.'
8 3
The Court first addressed the meaning of "the waters of the
United States" in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
184
There, the Court held that a wetland may not be considered adjacent
to remote "waters of the United States" based on a mere hydrologic
connection.1 85 Riverside Bayview rested on an inherent ambiguity in
defining where the "water" ends and its abutting ("adjacent")
wetlands begin, permitting the Corps to rely on ecological
considerations only to resolve that ambiguity in favor of treating all
abutting wetlands as waters.' 86 Isolated ponds are not "waters of the
United States" in their own right and present no boundary-drawing
problem justifying the invocation of such ecological factors. 187 Thus,
only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies
that are "waters of the United States" in their own right, so that there
is no clear demarcation between the two, are "adjacent" to such
waters and covered by the Act.18 8 This interpretation was further
asserted in the SWANCC decision where the Court held that Riverside
Bayview did not establish Corps' jurisdiction over ponds that were
not adjacent to open water.1 89
Even after the Court's restrictive decisions in Riverside Bayview
and SWANCC, the lower courts continued to expand the meaning of
"waters" to encompass seemingly insignificant water supplies, such
as a "roadside ditch" and the "'washes and arroyos' of an 'arid
development site. ' 9°  Consequently, the Court granted certiorari
here to create some sort of test, rather than continuing to rely on
182. 33 U.S.C § 1251(b).
183. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 181-83.
184. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at2217.
190. Id. at 2218.
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seemingly arbitrary ad hoc determinations. 1
91
In Part II and III, Justice Scalia addresses the consolidated cases
at issue here.' 92 Justice Scalia rejects the Corps' broad interpretation
of "waters of the United States," calling it a "Land Is Waters"
approach to federal jurisdiction.'9 3 Instead, he argues, a body of
water must meet two criteria to fall under the CWA.
First, waters must be "relatively permanent, standing or flowing
bodies of water," such as a stream, ocean, river, or lake.
19 4
Ephemeral flows do not fall within a "commonsense understanding"
of the word "waters." 195 Establishing coverage of the Rapanos and
Carabell sites requires finding that the adjacent channel contains a
relatively permanent "water of the United States," and that each
wetland has a continuous surface connection to that water, making it
difficult to determine where the water ends and the wetland begins.' 96
Justice Scalia argues that this cannot be found because the traditional
and ordinary meaning of the phrase "waters of the United States"
does not include ephemeral streams that "periodically provide
drainage for rainfall."' 97  Justice Scalia reaches this conclusion
through three steps. 198 First, "the waters of the United States" are not
the same as "navigable waters" according to the CWA.1 99 The use of
the definite article "the" and the plural "waters" shows plainly that
Section 1362(7) does not refer to water in general, but more narrowly
to water "[a]s found in streams," "oceans, rivers, [and] lakes." 200
Those terms all connote relatively permanent bodies of water, as
opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which water occasionally
or intermittently flows. 20' Second, the use of the term "navigable
waters" further confirms that the Corps holds jurisdiction over only
191. Id. at 2217.
192. Id. at 2219.
193. Id. at 2222.
194. Id. at 2221.
195. Id. at 2222.
196. Id. at 2219.
197. Id. at 2225.
198. Id. at 2220-24.
199. Id. at 2220.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2221.
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relatively permanent bodies of water.20 2 Third, while the Court in
Riverside Bayview upheld the inclusion of wetlands abutting
hydrologic features, nowhere in the opinion did the Court intend to
include wetlands in their own right.20 3
In Part IV of the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia addresses his
second criterion to determine whether a wetland may be considered
"adjacent to" remote "waters of the United States," because of a mere
hydrologic connection to them.204 Since Riverside Bayview and
SWANCC viewed the connection between waters and wetlands that
they blend into with utmost significance, it would lack sound
reasoning to conclude that the disconnected wetlands in Rapanos
could be considered "waters of United States." 20 5 According to past
precedent and legislative history, Justice Scalia concludes that "only
those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that
are 'waters of the United States' in their own right, so that there is no
clear demarcation between 'waters' and wetlands, are 'adjacent to'
such waters and covered by the Act." 20 6
Remanding both cases for application of his opinion, Justice
Scalia rejected the Sixth Circuit's view that a mere "hydrologic
connection" to waters of the United States is sufficient to bring a
wetland within the CWA's domain. 20 7
B. Concurring Opinions
1. Chief Justice Roberts' Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, the Chief Justice further seeks to repair
the chasm between Congress' original intent and the Court's
boundless grant of authority bestowed on the Corps.20 8 The tide
ebbed with the decision in SWANCC, where the Court rejected the
Corps overarching authority to regulate wetlands. 20 9 Soon after this
202. Id. at 2222.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2225.
205. Id. at 2226.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2225.
208. Id. at 2235 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
209. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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threat to agency power, the Corps sought, in connection with the
EPA, to clarify the scope of "waters" under Corps jurisdiction.210
While this was a difficult task, within the meaning of science, law,
and politics, the Chief Justice noted that the Corps and the EPA
"enjoyed plenty of room to operate in developing some notion of an
outer bound to the reach of their authority. "211
Much to the Chief Justice's chagrin, the Corps essentially ignored
the decision in SWANCC and "chose to adhere to its essentially
boundless view of the scope of its power., 212  A sense of
disappointment reverberates through the concurrence as the Chief
Justice accepts that without a majority opinion, the courts will have
to "feel their way on a case-by-case basis., 21 3 While many decisions
are decided in such ad hoc fashion, the Chief Justice sees no reason
for the application of this method here where the Court already
determined a proper definition of "waters of the United States" in
SWANCC.
2 14
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence: "Significant Nexus" Requirement
Justice Kennedy wrote a second concurring opinion, which
illustrates a middle ground between Justice Scalia's four-justice
plurality and Justice Steven's four-justice dissent.21 5  Justice
Kennedy, like Justice Scalia, rejected the Corps interpretation of
navigable waters as overbroad. However, while pondering the
importance of the term "navigable" he proposed a proper measure of
significance achieved in the "significant nexus" test.216 He stated
that the test should be informed by the CWA's goal of "restor[ing]
and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
210. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
211. Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
212. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
213. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
214. Id. In his footnote, the Chief Justice suggests that Justice Stevens viewed
the proposed rulemaking too narrowly. The Court's decision in SWANCC was
meant to provide guidelines to aid the Corps in determining their jurisdictional
scope. It was not meant to say that the agencies should essentially ignore the
decision and "decide for themselves whether...it was wise for them to take no
action in response to SWANCC." Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
215. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 2241 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the Nation's waters." 21 7  Thus, he said that a "significant nexus"
would exist if the wetlands "significantly affect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as 'navigable.' 218 Furthermore, the link cannot
be "speculative or insubstantial., 219 If a wetland is adjacent to a
navigable in fact waterway, jurisdiction can rest on a "reasonable
inference of ecologic inter-connection." 220 When, on the other hand,
a wetland is adjacent to a non-navigable waterway, the Corps must
establish a "significant nexus on a case-by-case basis. '"221 While
Justice Kennedy agrees that the case should be remanded, he
concludes that there was a possible significant nexus in both cases.
222
Unfortunately for lower courts, his conclusion was bleak: a bright
line test is nearly impossible due to the intricate legal and ecological
concepts at issue here.223
Justice Kennedy begins with a brief background of the CWA and
both the Rapanos and Carabell cases.2 24 While the case descriptions
do not bode well for petitioners, Justice Kennedy turns his analysis to
the letter of the law, not the seemingly unsavory actions of
petitioners. 225 The purpose of the consolidated cases is to determine
the Corps' proper scope of authority, not to punish for permit
violations. 22
6
In Part II of his concurrence, Justice Kennedy analyzes two
previous cases where the Supreme Court construed "navigable
waters": Riverside Bayview and SWANCC.2 27 In Riverside Bayview,
the Court upheld the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to
navigable-in-fact watercourses.228  Similar to the property in
Carabell, the wetlands in Riverside Bayview were located about one
217. Id. at 2248 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(2000)).
218. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
219. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
220. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 2249 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 2236-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 2236-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 2240-51 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 2240 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Spring 2007
198 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-1
mile away from Lake St. Clair in Michigan. 229 However, Riverside
Bayview is distinguishable from both cases at issue because the land
formed part of a wetland that directly abutted a navigable-in-fact
creek, thus creating a "significant nexus" between the wetlands and
navigable waters. 230  While the Court in Riverside Bayview
determined that the Corps would hold jurisdiction over navigable-in-
fact waters, it did not discuss the Corps' "authority to regulate
wetlands other than those adjacent to open waters." 231
In SWANCC, the Court assessed the "validity of the Corps'
jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats that were isolated in the sense
of being unconnected to other waters covered by the [CWA]. 232 The
Court determined that these ponds were not significantly connected
with navigable-in-fact waters. 233  In other words there was no
significant nexus between the isolated ponds and any navigable
water.234 "Because such a nexus was lacking... the Court held that
the plain text of the statute did not permit the Corps' action." 2
35
Justice Kennedy searches for middle ground between the plurality
and the dissent by elaborating on the "significant nexus" test relied
on in Bayview Homes (which is not discussed in either the plurality
or dissent).236 First, Justice Kennedy critiques two of the plurality's
limitations on the CWA: (1) requirement of permanent standing
water or continuous flow and (2) "exclusion of wetlands lacking a
continuous surface connection to other jurisdictional waters. 237
Based on these critiques, he concludes that most, if not all wetlands
meet the significant nexus test because wetlands perform critical
ecosystem services related to the quality of other waters, such as
flood control, pollutant trapping, viable habitat, and runoff storage.238
Thus, since wetlands contribute to the hydrological, physical,
chemical, and biological integrity of traditionally navigable waters,
229. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
230. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
231. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 2241 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
234. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
235. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 2242-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 2247 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
the Corps should hold jurisdiction over them under the CWA.239
While the plurality limits the scope of the Corps' power, the
dissent focuses too much on the "navigable" requirement.2 40 At this
point in the concurrence, Justice Kennedy must again argue that the
Court cannot completely abandon the term "navigable" in its
analysis. 241 Justice Kennedy believes that the wetlands at issue do
amount to "navigable waters" under the significant nexus test, but he
refuses to extend this classification to "remote and insubstantial"
waters, such as "wetlands that lie alongside a ditch or drain that
eventually may flow into traditional navigable waters." 242 However,
Justice Kennedy does want to give the term "navigable" some
meaning in the Court's analysis.243
In conclusion, Justice Kennedy states that a remand would be
appropriate since neither the agency nor the reviewing courts
properly considered the issue.244 Because Justice Kennedy concurred
in the judgment on the narrowest rounds, his middle ground test
represents a pragmatic alternative to today's polarized environmental
law and policy.
C. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Steven's Dissent
The dissent begins with the view that Riverside Bayview is
controlling authority and criticizes the plurality for relying too
heavily on SWANCC.245
In stark contrast to Riverside Bayview, however, SWANCC made
no mention of wetlands, let alone of wetlands adjacent to
traditionally navigable waters or their tributaries. 246  Instead,
SWANCC dealt with the Corps' jurisdiction over isolated waters,
239. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
240. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 2247 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 2250 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in his
dissent by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.
246. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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meaning "waters that are not part of a tributary system to interstate
waters or to navigable waters of the United States, the degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate commerce."
247
Justice Stevens first discusses Congress' deliberate acquiescence
to the Corps' regulations in 1977.248 Both the House and Senate
conducted extensive debates about the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction
over wetlands, rejected efforts to limit this jurisdiction, and
appropriated funds for a "National Wetlands Inventory" to help the
States "in the development and operation of programs under this
Act.
249
Justice Stevens next delves into a cost/benefit analysis by
weighing the cost of obtaining section 404 permits and the
importance in protecting wetland eco-hydrologic systems.
250
Obtaining a wetland dredging permit is quite expensive; however,
wetlands provide various ecosystem services which offset potential
future water quality and purification expenses. "The importance of
wetlands for water quality is hard to overstate. ' 251 Wetlands reduce
flooding, protect shorelines, recharge ground water, trap suspended
sediment, filter out toxic pollutants, and protect fish and wildlife.
25 2
In Part III Justice Stevens critiques the plurality opinion. First he
discusses, arbitrary lines drawn by the plurality.
253
Under the plurality's view ... the Corps can regulate
polluters who dump dredge into a stream that flows
year round but may not be able to regulate polluters
who dump into a neighboring stream that flows for
only 290 days of the year - even if the dredge in this
second stream would have the same effect on
downstream waters as the dredge in the year-round
one.
254
247. Id. at 2256 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2259.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 2260.
Justice Stevens is also concerned with the plurality's disregard
for the CWA's significance. 255  Furthermore, Justice Stevens is
troubled by the plurality's characterization of the term "adjacent."
Lastly, the dissent criticizes the plurality's rejection of thirty years of
precedent.
In conclusion, the dissent agrees that the court should have
affirmed the judgments in both cases. 256 "It has been the Court's
practice in a case coming . . . from a lower federal court to enter a
judgment commanding that court to conduct any further proceedings
pursuant to a specific mandate."257  That prior practice has, on
occasion, made it necessary for Justices to join a judgment that did
not conform to their own views. 258 In these cases, however, while
both the plurality and Justice Kennedy agree that there must be a
remand for further proceedings. Their respective opinions would
apply different tests of remand.259 Given that all four Justices who
have joined this opinion would uphold the Corps' jurisdiction in both
of these cases - and all other cases in which either the plurality's or
Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied - on remand, each of the
judgments should be reinstated if either of those tests is met.26 °
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Breyer looks to the root of the issue by
addressing the CWA's purpose. 26 1 In order to protect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, the term
"waters" must be defined broadly.262 In fact, Justice Breyer believes
that the Corps should structure the appropriate scope of the term.263
He figures that the Court should take a "hands off' approach and
allow the experts, in this case the Army Corps of Engineers, to
update their regulations and the Court should give deference to
255. Id.
256. Id. at 2265.
257. Id.
258 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2240-64.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 2265.
261. Id. at 2266.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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them.264 Otherwise, courts' "ad hoc determinations ... run the risk
of transforming scientific questions into matters of law," which is not
what Congress intended.265
V. IMPACT
The ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos v.
United States may lack the precedential value desired by lower
courts, but will impact legislative action and lower court decisions by
providing two models for analysis: the plurality two-part approach
analyzing adjacency and continuous surface connection, and the
Kennedy "significant nexus" test.
A. Legislative Impact
Chief Justice Roberts offers the most telling observation in his
concurring opinion: "It is unfortunate that no opinion commands a
majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress' limits on
the reach of the Clean Water Act. Lower courts and the regulated
entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis. "266
Despite the uncertainty, some speculation on the future is
justified. The Corps' definition of "waters of the United States" in
33 C.F.R. § 328 has remained largely intact.267 The only difference
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236.
267. 33 C.F.R. Part 328.1-5(2006). Section 328 of the Code of Federal
Regulations comprises a definition of waters of the United States. This definition
is used in CFR parts 320-330. For purposes of this section, the term "waters of the
United States" means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide; (2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; (3)
All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters: (i)
which are or could be used for recreation; or (ii) from which fish
or shellfish are or could be taken and sold; or (iii) which are used
is that wetlands will either need to be adjacent to navigable waters or
there must be a "significant nexus" between such wetlands and
navigable waters. This determination may be based on the effects of
the individual wetland in question and whether the wetlands either
alone or in combination with similar lands in the region have a
significant nexus to traditional navigable waters. The level at which
the Corps sets the bar for a significant nexus determination will
greatly influence the extent to which it maintains or relinquishes its
current jurisdiction.
Neither Justice Scalia's plurality nor Justice Kennedy's
concurrence specifically address the issue of whether drainage
ditches are to be considered tributaries to navigable waters. The
Corps might continue to claim jurisdiction over remote and
insignificant drainage ditches, ephemeral channels and other features
as potential jurisdictional tributaries. However, an objective reading
of Justice Kennedy's concurrence provides that the "significant
nexus" test should apply to both the adjacency and the tributary
issues.
The Corps and EPA will most likely focus on providing guidance
and direction in applying the new standard. The Corps has already
made some headway in this area, as noted in section C.
Administrative Impacts, below. In the meantime, uncertainty will
prevail and new fill permit-seekers should anticipate considerable
delay and expense. In particular, such permit-seekers will need to
hire sophisticated consultants to determine the existence of potential
wetlands on their properties. In addition, consultants must be given a
standard unit of measurement to calculate the physical scope of a
wetland delineation. It will also be important for the EPA or the
Corps to define the parameters of a region for the purposes of
determining a significant nexus. A clear understanding of uniform
parameters is crucial because the broader the area in which the
significant nexus determination is evaluated, the more likely it is that
a significant nexus will be found. On the other hand, if the region
or could be used by industry; (4) All impoundments of waters
otherwise defined as waters of the United States under the
definition; (5) Other tributaries of waters; including territorial
seas; (6) Wetlands adjacent to waters; (7) Waste treatment
systems.
Id. However, waters of the United States do not include converted cropland.
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comprises a narrower area, a determination that there is no significant
nexus is more likely.268
B. Judicial Impact
The most apparent judicial impact is that lower courts will
continue to struggle over wetland fill permit disputes. Since there is
no majority opinion, lower courts can essentially choose to adopt one
view over another. If the courts follow the plurality, it would
substantially restrain federal jurisdiction under the CWA. If, on the
other hand, lower courts adopt Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus"
test, the limitation on federal authority will diverge on a case-by-case
basis depending on whether the court gives the test a narrow or broad
conception. 269 Overall, it is more likely that Corps' jurisdiction will
diminish in areas where ephemeral channels and arid landscapes
prevail.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion requires lower courts to
distinguish wetlands significantly connected to "those relatively
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water
'forming geographical features' that are described in ordinary
parlance as 'streams, oceans, rivers and lakes" from wetlands that
have no adjacency to navigable in fact waters. 270 Any waters
comparable to those at issue in the Rapanos case are not likely to
meet this jurisdictional test. The evidence in Rapanos does not
differentiate the wetlands from streams, rivers, or lakes primarily
because they are the result of man-made drainage ditches. 271
The Kennedy concurrence, on the other hand, asks the courts to
determine if regulated wetlands "either alone or in combination with
similarly situated lands, in the region, significantly affect the
268. Id. at 2249. Justice Kennedy recognized this need for a standard unit for
measurement and a clear definition of a region for the purposes of wetland
delineation: "Where an adequate nexus is established for a particular wetland, it
may be permissible, as a matter of administrative convenience or necessity, to
presume covered status for other comparable wetlands in the region. That issue,
however, is neither raised by these facts nor addressed... here." Id.
269. See N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1023 (9th
Cir. 2006) (concluding that Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test is controlling).
270. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225.
271. Id. at 2238.
chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of navigable in fact
waters. 272  This statement embodies his "significant nexus" test.
Under this test, properties similar to those in Rapanos will only meet
this test if lower courts construe and apply it broadly. Even so, a site-
specific analysis is probably necessary to accurately decipher the
water's affect on downstream navigable-in-fact waters. In Rapanos,
there was no such site-specific analysis.273
C. Administrative Impact
The Rapanos decision sent a clear message to the United States
Army Corps of Engineers: they will be on the front line of
interpreting this murky decision. The United States Army Corps of
Engineers will continue to assess jurisdiction regarding wetlands not
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters on a case-by-case basis.27 4
The Corps is proposing to allocate greater protection for
ephemeral waterways.275 In adapting nationwide permits (NWPs) to
the Rapanos decision, the Corps looks to apply the regular 300
linear-foot limit for loss of stream bed to more intermittent and
ephemeral streams, like those in Rapanos.27 6  But, if a district
engineer finds that a loss of more than 300 linear feet of ephemeral
stream bed will minimally affect the aquatic environment, a waiver,
in writing, can be granted.277 Before Rapanos, no waiver process
was necessary because impacts to ephemeral streams were not
included in the 300 linear foot limit for determining compliance with
NWPs. 278  This new regulation will help to simplify the Corps
administration of the NWP program. 279 However, a greater reliance
of fact-finding will be necessary because many topographic maps do
not show intermittent and ephemeral stream locations, resulting in
272. Id. at 2248.
273. Id. at 2250-5 1.
274. Proposal to Reissue and Modify Nationwide Permits, 71 Fed. Reg. 186
(proposed Sept. 26, 2006).
275 Id. The 300 linear foot limit is found in the terms of NWPs 29, 39, 40,
and 42. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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greater reliance on site visits or more detailed permit applications.2 80
The Corps is also proposing to modify the definition of "loss of
waters of the United States" to include ephemeral stream bed filling
and excavation when determining whether proposed activities exceed
the NWPs' threshold limits. 2
81
Overall, where the Corps jurisdiction lacks or is uncertain,
existing state and local regulations will fill in to provide direction.
New guidance from the Courts, the EPA, and the Corps is greatly
anticipated and expected to pan out in the near future.
D. Social Impact
The Rapanos case illustrates two sides of the environmental
debate between developers and preservationists. Under Rapanos,
developers' rights significantly expanded, resulting in the increased
ability to fill wetland areas without the overly broad discretion
previously held by the Army Corps of Engineers. The National
Association of Home Builders (NAHB) said that it was "encouraged"
by the decision. 282  Barton Schmidt, the NAHB director of
environmental communications stated that "this is a step forward for
affordable housing and the battle against excessive regulation. '" 283
However, others had an overcast view on the outcome.
Environmentalists did not get the affirmation that would have given
the Corps continued broad authority to regulate wetlands, even
though they are not directly adjacent to navigable waterways. The
280. Id.
For those NWPs that have both an acreage limit and a linear foot
limit for stream bed impacts, the acreage of stream impacts (i.e.,
the length of the stream bed filled or excavated times the average
width of the stream, from OHWM to OHWM) applies towards
that acreage limit. For example, if a proposed NWP 39 activity
involves filling 1/10 acre of non-tidal wetlands and 100 linear
feet of a stream bed with an average width of 10 feet, the acreage
loss of waters of the United States for that activity is 0.123 acre.
Id.
281. Id.
282. Lawlor, James D., Wetlands: Law & Regulation Report, Court Decision
- More Corps Precision, Vol. 3 No. 6, 51 (June 2006).
283. Id. at 52.
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American Audubon Society said that the decision "created chaos for
protections of over fifty percent of the nation's waters," adding that
the decision "signaled an environmentally unfriendly director for the
court.,
2 84
However, neither group is really satisfied because the decision
doesn't provide clear guidance for future decisions. Without a
majority opinion, the case falls back down to the lower courts for
continued debate in determining the proper scope of the Corps
jurisdiction in regulating the wetland fill. John Kusler, associate
director of the Association of State Wetlands Managers predicted
how landowners will react as a result of the opinion:
If I were sitting on a chunk of land and I had a permit
turned down and it was one of the drier inland
wetlands, I would take some language from Scalia's
opinion, maybe a little bit of Kennedy, and I would
challenged. I think we're going to see a whole bunch
of challenges. People will go out on a limb even if
there just a small chance of winning.285
Unless Congress adopts new legislation, the Corps will be
responsible for interpreting this decision. However, as Kusler noted,
there will be more court cases on this issue. When and if these lower
court cases again reach the Supreme Court, the Roberts Court will be
sharply divided on environmental issues.
Additionally, the Rapanos case will have an impact on legal
treatment of hydrobiological systems. The Court's opinion, though a
logical interpretation of the English language, creates a disconnect
between the law and science. While the words "waters of the United
States" might linguistically apply to those particularly robust,
permanent flowing or standing bodies, the science of hydrology
explains the phrase in a more holistic nature. In looking back on the
purpose of the CWA, it is clear that the purpose of the act is to
protect continued human health through the preservation of the
earth's water resources. While we might traditionally think of a
shimmering lake or raging river in our efforts to protect our water,
284. Id.
285. Id.
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groundwater, swamps, and marshes deserve just as much, if not more
security.
Riparian zones possess an unusual diversity of species and
provide various ecosystem services, such as water purification and
erosion mitigation."' The ecological diversity is related to variable
flood systems, geographically unique channel processes, attitudinal
climate shifts, and upland influences on the fluvial corridor.287 The
resulting dynamic environment supports a variety of aquatic life
cycles, biogeochemical cycles and rates, and organisms adapted to
unstable ecosystems over broad temporal and spatial scales.288 If
courts fail to recognize the dynamic ecosystem services provided by
wetlands, we can hardly expect legislatures to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos v. United States
significantly alters the scope of federal authority under the Clean
Water Act. However, it is yet to be seen how lower courts and
federal regulators will adhere to the Supreme Court's limits on the
scope of federal power.
286. Robert J. Naiman & Henri Decamps, The Ecology of Interfaces: Riparian
Zones, ANN. REv. ECOL. SYST. 1997, 28:621-58.
287. Id. at 622-23.
288. Id.
